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Simultaneous Use of Black, Green, and White Certificate Systems 
Eirik S. Amundsen* and Torstein Bye**
abstract
We formulate a long run model with black, green and white certificate markets that 
function in conjunction with an electricity market. The markets function well to-
gether in the sense that a common equilibrium solution exists, where all targets are 
satisfied (e.g., the share of green electricity and share of energy saving/ efficiency 
increase). The equilibrium solution adapts to changing targets but it is, in general, 
impossible to tell whether this will lead to more, less, or unchanged consumption 
of “black,” “green” or “white” electricity. Hence, if the long run target is to expand 
the capacity of green electricity generation and energy savings to certain given 
levels, then these markets may not be the best to use.  To obtain clear results, 
specific parameter values and functional forms are needed. An example based on 
Norwegian data is provided. In addition, gains and losses in terms of consumers’ 
and producers’ surpluses are calculated. 
Keywords: renewable energy, electricity, Green Certificates, White Certificates
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1. INTRODUCTION
Many countries have set targets on greenhouse gas emissions, the share of renewables and 
the share of energy saving (energy efficiency). For these purposes, various market-based mecha-
nisms have been proposed and implemented. In addition to the well-established emissions permit 
systems (“black” certificates) designed to curb greenhouse gas emissions, so-called “green” and 
“white” certificate systems have also been initiated.1 Green certificate systems are designed to meet 
the target on renewables, while white certificates are intended for achieving the energy savings 
target. Energy savings is to be understood as additionally generated savings compared with what 
would otherwise occur due to increasing energy prices.2 The main objective of this paper is to inves-
tigate the compatibility of these certificate systems as they act in concert. 
1. The EU “black” certificate system (EU ETS) is the most developed system for carbon emissions and has been in exist-
ence since 2005. Green certificate systems are in use in several countries, e.g., the UK (“Renewable Obligation Certificates”, 
Norway and Sweden (“elsertifikater”) and the US (“Renewable Portfolio Standards”), while white certificate systems may be 
found in France (“Certificates d’Economie d’Eenergie”), Italy (“Titoli di Efficienza Energetica”), the UK (“Energy Efficiency 
Commitment”) and the US (Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Nevada)(“Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standards). In addition,, sev-
eral countries have a black, a green and a white certificate system, e.g., the UK, Italy, and Poland. 
2. The EU target on energy savings/ energy efficiency increase is formulated as a 20 percent reduction of energy use 
in 2020 compared with what it otherwise would have been in 2020. http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-efficiency/
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Black, green and white certificates have in common a process by which the price of the 
certificate is determined in an interaction between supply and demand in a market. However, unlike 
a black certificate system that is designed to tax firms for their greenhouse gas emissions, the green 
and white certificate systems involve both indirect taxes and subsidies endogenously determined in 
the market. Producers of renewable energy and generators of energy saving activities receive a sub-
sidy in terms of marketable certificates (supplied free of charge) while the purchasers of electricity 
and the receivers of energy saving improvements (end-users/ retailers of energy) are paying a tax 
in terms of obligatory purchases of certificates. Hence, the green and white certificate systems are 
self-contained in the sense that taxation and subsidization occurs within the energy market itself 
without involving the government directly in terms of revenues (contrary to the case of the black 
certificate system).
The stated motivations for adopting such systems are many and range from the regulation 
of market failures to environmental preservation, job creation and innovation with a consideration 
for distributional equity and political feasibility (Goulder and Parry, 2008; Fischer and Preonas, 
2010). In particular, the three certificate systems may be related to proper market failures such as 
climate change (a negative externality), security of supply (comprising aspects of a public good, see 
Joskow, 2008) and energy efficiency gaps (partly due to lack of the public good: information, see 
Jaffe and Stavins, 1994). Hence, the adoption of these systems may be seen as attempts to correct 
for market failures where the cost of this is levied on the producers of fossil energy and end users 
of energy. The point is that the marginal private cost of fossil energy generation should be raised 
to reflect the marginal social cost by adding a marginal externality cost and that the generation of 
public goods should be stimulated to a level above what would otherwise occur if left to the private 
sectors alone. The ability of these systems to cost-effectively account for market failures of the 
above mentioned types will be discussed later. Along with this the relevance and efficiency of some 
of the goals and sub-goals will be discussed and questioned. Still such goals are imbedded in the 
legislation in many economies (e.g. within the EU/EEA), wherefore analyses of which instruments 
best achieve these goals are relevant, even though some of the goals and targets may be considered 
inefficient from an economic point of view. 
There exists an abundant literature on the functioning of black certificate systems (see, e.g., 
Ellerman, 2010). In addition, a sizable literature on green certificate system has emerged, whereas 
the literature on white certificates is somewhat more limited (Mundaca and Neij, 2006; Pavan, 
2008; Child et al., 2008; Sorrel et al., 2009; Wirl, 2015; Giraudet and Finon, 2015). Some of the 
literature addresses the interplay between the green certificate market and the electricity market 
(e.g., Bye, 2003; Nese, 2003; Amundsen, Baldursson and Mortensen, 2006; Fischer, 2009; Fischer 
and Preonas, 2010), while some consider the electricity market, the black certificate market and the 
green certificate market (e.g., Amundsen and Mortensen, 2001, 2002; Unger and Ahlgren, 2005; 
Böhringer and Rosendahl, 2010). Recently, some literature has emerged addressing all certificate 
systems taken together (Meran and Wittmann, 2012). 
Considering each by itself, all certificate systems may, under given conditions, achieve the 
targets they are designed for, but as the targets for renewables and energy savings typically are set 
in percentages, one cannot immediately conclude anything about the quantities of renewables or 
energy savings resulting from, say, harsher targets. For instance, it has been shown that an increase 
in the required share of green electricity may result in less green electricity due to price effects in 
the electricity market (Amundsen and Mortensen, 2001). However, the opposite may also be true, 
energy-efficiency-directive
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and harsher targets of renewables may even lead to increasing electricity consumption (Bye, 2003; 
Fischer, 2009).  
In addition to this, further complications arise when several systems are in use at the same 
time. For instance, Amundsen and Mortensen (2001) show that a higher price on black certificates 
leads to less green electricity generation when using a green certificate system, while Böhringer and 
Rosendahl (2010)) show that a green certificate system on top of a black certificate system serves 
the dirtiest power technologies compared with a black certificate system alone. This result is also 
supported by Fischer and Preonas (2010) in their analysis. Along the same lines, Meran and Witt-
mann (2012) show that demand side management (e.g., using a white certificate system) achieves 
its underlying goal of an increase in end-users’ energy efficiency solely at the expense of a reduced 
environmental efficiency of energy production. Clearly, adding a white certificate system on top of 
the black and green certificate systems further complicates matters. Inherently, there may be a con-
flict, e.g., if a green certificate system stimulates electricity demand, then it may run counter to the 
intension of the white certificate system, i.e., to stimulate energy saving/ energy efficiency. 
In this paper, we investigated the interplay and compatibility of the three certificate sys-
tems further as they work jointly in an electricity market. The motivation for this investigation is that 
additional white certificate systems have actually been adopted or are planned to be used in several 
countries. Hence, it should be of interest to investigate whether these systems are at least compatible 
in theory when considering all markets at the same time. 
Compared with the existing literature, e.g., Böhringer and Rosendahl (2010), Fischer and 
Preonas (2010), and Meran and Wittmann (2012), we aimed to further untangle the various effects 
of partial changes of the strength of the various targets. For instance, we investigate whether a 
harsher target on green electricity generation leads to more or less energy savings being generated, 
or whether a harsher target of energy savings leads to more or less green electricity being generated. 
Likewise, we investigate what effects a harsher target on black electricity reduction has on green 
and white electricity generation. 
To answer questions such as these, we formulate a model and consider equilibrium solu-
tions where the various targets are complied with for any chosen level of the targets. The model 
applied is a stylized analytical model that ignores complicating effects of lumpiness and Kirchhoff’s 
Voltage Law (KVL) that typically imply underestimation of total costs and lead to distortion of in-
vestment incentives and market equilibrium. However, even in such a simplified stylized model the 
results are, to a large extent, ambiguous when considering the market effects on the various types 
of electricity products: “green electricity,” “black electricity” and “white electricity” (electricity 
savings) following these systems. Because analytical results are ambiguous, a detailed discussion 
of partial effects is called for in order to understand how these markets function. In addition, to 
further elucidate how such markets may function we investigate the systems in a numerical model 
considering realistic data and parameter values compiled from the Norwegian electricity sector. 
Clearer results now appear, although some ambiguities remain. Along with this, we also study the 
distributional effects in terms of consumers’ surplus, producers’ surplus and social surplus, and ask 
which party is gaining and which is losing from introducing harsher targets.  
2. MODEL 
To analyze the interplay between an electricity market, a tradable green certificate (TGC) 
market and a tradable white certificate (TWC) market, we consider an economic model building on 
the following assumptions. Electricity producers supply a common wholesale market within which 
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a single wholesale electricity price is established. Electricity generation is based on both fossil fuel 
(“black electricity”) and renewable sources (“green electricity”). In addition to the wholesale price, 
producers of green electricity obtain one TGC per unit of green electricity delivered. This may be 
sold on the TGC market. Producers of black electricity obtain only the wholesale price. 
Electricity producers/ distributors3 also provide energy savings (“white electricity”) 
through, e.g., ancillary services, installation of smart devices, and technological improvements, and 
obtain a price per unit electricity saved valued at the wholesale price. In addition, they obtain one 
TWC per unit of energy saved, to be sold on the TWC market. Retailers purchase electricity on the 
wholesale market for delivery to end-users. The retailers are obliged to purchase TGCs on the TGC 
market, and TWCs on the TWC market corresponding to certain percentage requirements. The elec-
tricity is distributed to end users, and a single end-user price is established. End-users are assumed 
to consider additional electricity savings as equivalent to electricity consumption, i.e., one unit of 
electricity saved as a result of the TWC system (“white electricity”) has the same value as one extra 
unit of electricity consumed. Hence, an inverse demand function is defined over the sum of the three 
types of electricity, for short, called “electricity equivalents.” 
A public authority is assumed to issue TGCs in a one-to-one relationship to the amount of 
green electricity generated and to set a TGC percentage requirement for the end users/ retailers as 
a proportion of electricity delivered to end users. In the same way, the public authority is assumed 
to issue TWCs and to set a percentage requirement for TWC purchases for the end users/ retailers. 
Hence, both percentage requirements are set according to electricity actually delivered and not ac-
cording to total consumption of electricity equivalents. In addition, it is assumed that carbon emis-
sions stemming from the generation of black electricity are regulated by a permit system or a tax. To 
account for this, the price (tax or permit price) of carbon emissions is included in the cost functions 
of black electricity generation.  
It is assumed that perfect competition prevails in all markets, with many producers of elec-
tricity (both black, green and white), many retailers, and many end users. Hence, all agents treat the 
various prices as given by the market. 
We apply the following symbols and functional relationships.
xb = Quantity of electricity generated from fossil sources (black electricity) 
xg = Quantity of electricity generated from non-fossil sources (green electricity) 
xw = Quantity of additional electricity savings (white electricity) 
x = Total quantity of electricity equivalents, i.e., x = xb + xg + xw
p = Marginal value of consumption of electricity equivalents
pe = Wholesale price of electricity
pgc =Price of TGCs
pwc = Price of TWCs
α =  Percentage requirement for green electricity as a proportion of electricity consump-
tion of black and green electricity, i.e., xg = α(xb + xg)
β =  Percentage requirement for electricity saving (white electricity) as a proportion of 
electricity consumption of the sum of black and green electricity, i.e., xw  = β (xb + xg)
τ =  Parameter representing a carbon emission permit price or a carbon tax (“carbon 
price“)
3. Observe that the white certificate system is a system for promoting energy savings in addition to what would otherwise 
occur due to, e.g., generally increasing energy prices. It is the producers/ distributors of energy that undertake energy efficiency 
measures for the final users that are consistent with a pre-defined percentage of their annual energy deliverance (see Pavan 
2008; and Giraudet and Finon, 2015).
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gd = Demand of TGCs
gs = Supply of TGCs 
wd = Demand of TWCs
ws = Supply of TWCs
p(x) = Inverse demand function of electricity equivalents, where ( ( ) ) ' 0∂ ∂ = <p x x p
( , )τb bC x  =  Industry cost function
4 for black electricity with fossil emission constraints, 
where '( ) 0∂ ∂ = >b b bC x C , 
2 2 ''( ) 0∂ ∂ = ≥b b bC x C , 
'( ) 0ττ∂ ∂ = >eC C  and 
2 ''( ) 0ττ∂ ∂ ∂ = >eb b xC x C
5 
( )g gC x  =  Industry cost function for green electricity, where 
'( ) 0∂ ∂ = >g g gC x C , 
2 2 ''( ) 0∂ ∂ = >g g gC x C 6
( )w wC x  =  Industry cost function for white electricity, where 
'( ) 0∂ ∂ = >w w eC x C , 
2 2 ''( ) 0∂ ∂ = >w w wC x C 7
In aggregate, producers maximize profit:
( , , ) [ ] [ ] ( , ) ( ) ( )τΠ = + + + + − − −b g w e b e gc g e wc w b b g g w wx x x p x p p x p p x C x C x C x
The first-order conditions for black, green and white electricity generation, respectively, 
are
'=e bp C , 
'+ =e gc gp p C , 
'+ =e wc wp p C                                              (1)
i.e., the seller price (wholesale price plus certificate price) equals the marginal cost for each of the 
electricity equivalents. 
For each unit of electricity equivalents delivered to end users, retailers must pay the whole-
sale price plus a share equal to ( 1 )α β+  of the TGC price as well as a share equal to ( 1 )β β+  
of the TWC price. For simplicity, electricity distribution is assumed costless. With a large num-
ber of retailers, the competitive equilibrium established by the market must be characterized by 
a consumer price equal to a weighted average of the wholesale price and the certificate prices:
( ) ( (1 )) ( / (1 ))α β β β= + + + +e gc wcp x p p p . Otherwise, we assume that both the amount of TGCs 
4. The industry cost function is derived by “horizontal summation” of the individual cost functions, i.e., the cost of ag-
gregate market supply is minimized. Using the industry cost function avoids using messy notation to describe individual de-
cisions. Our prime interest is in the equilibrium market solution, not individual decisions. Little information should be lost by 
this approach as individual first-order conditions for electricity producers correspond directly to those derived in the analysis. 
5. The cost function for black electricity conditional on an emission permit price or an emission tax may be derived from 
a standard cost minimization problem, with the additional constraint that a permit price or a tax will have to be paid per unit 
of carbon emitted.   
6. Black and green marginal costs are to be understood as long run marginal costs. These include both short run opera-
tional cost as well as long run capital costs. For many renewable technologies the short run marginal costs may be close to 
zero (e.g. wind power generation). However, the long run marginal costs may be sizable even for such renewable technolo-
gies. In principle the long run marginal costs should include the full cost of expanding the capacity for electricity provision 
including possible reinforcements of transmission capacity. Particular features relate to economies of scale and lumpiness 
in transmission expansion as well as to effects of the Kirchhoff’s Voltage Law (see e.g. Turvey, 2000; Smeers, 2005; Joskow 
and Tirol, 2005; Hirt, 2015). These features may affect the marginal costs of increasing the percentage requirements (see 
Munoz, Sauma and Hobbs, 2013). As already noted transmission lumpiness and Kirchhoff’s Voltage Law are not included 
in our model, but possible consequences are commented on in the numerical model for the Norwegian example to follow. 
7. Black electricity plants (e.g., coal fired plants) may well be replicated at constant cost whereas green electricity 
generation from wind power typically is restricted by Nature’s varying supply of good sites for windmills. White electricity 
is presumably also becoming increasingly costly at the margin as electricity savings are increased. Hence, contrary to the 
generation of black electricity, we only consider increasing marginal costs for green electricity generation and for white 
electricity and not constant marginal cost cases.
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and TWCs are measured in the same unit as green and white electricity, respectively. Thus, the de-
mand for TGCs is given by gd = α(xb + xg) and the supply by gs = xg. Likewise, the demand for TWCs 
is given by wd = β(xb + xg) and the supply by w s = xw. 
In equilibrium, the following conditions must be satisfied in addition to 1):
= + +b g wx x x x                                                                                         (2)
( )α= +g b gx x x                                                                                         (3)
( )β= +w b gx x x  (4)
( ) ( (1 )) ( / (1 ))α β β β= + + + +e gc wcp x p p p                                                (5)
Observe that the TGC and TWC systems imply that the revenues obtained from sales of 
certificates exactly correspond to the subsidies received by the producers of green electricity and 
the producers of white electricity. End users pay ( 1 )α β+ gcp x and ( 1 )β β+ wcp x, for TGCs and 
TWCs, respectively; while the producers of green electricity receive gc gp x , and the producers of 
white electricity receive wc wp x . To see that these sums are pairwise identical, note from 1), 2), and 
3) that ( (1 ))α β= +gx x and that ( (1 ))β β= +wx x.
Furthermore, by substituting 5) into 4), one may observe that
' ' '( ) 1 ( , ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1 1
α β α βτ
β β β β
 
= − − + + + + + + 
b b g g w wp x C x C x C x               (6)
i.e., in equilibrium, the marginal willingness to pay for electricity equivalents is equal to a linear 
(or convex) combination of marginal generation costs with the adjusted percentage requirements as 
weights.
3. RESULTS 
Total differentials with respect to the certificate shares α and β, and of τ show that the 
effects in general depend on all the supply elasticities, the demand elasticity and the parameters, 
α, β and τ as reported in Appendix A.  A summary of the impact of these parameters on the relevant 
variables is shown in Table 1. Results in the table show
that a TGC system and a TWC system achieve their objectives, namely, to increase the 
share of green electricity and to increase the share of electricity savings (white electricity) out of 
total electricity consumption, respectively. However, as the targets are formulated in terms of per-
centages, one cannot immediately draw any conclusions with respect to the effects on quantities of 
green and white electricity generated of introducing such instruments. 
In particular, Table 1 shows that an increase in the percentage requirement for green electric-
ity, α, does not necessarily lead to increased generation of green electricity8, nor does an increased per-
centage requirement for white electricity, β necessarily lead to more electricity savings. Hence, if the 
increase of the percentage requirement of green electricity leads to a reduced demand for electricity, 
the generation of green electricity may decrease and still satisfy the increased percentage requirement 
provided that the percentage reduction of green electricity is less than the percentage reduction of 
electricity consumption. Likewise, for an increase of the percentage requirement of white electric-
ity, savings may actually decrease if electricity demand decreases. The only clear result on quantity 
effects from introducing a TGC system and a TWC system is that the generation of black electricity 
definitely will decrease when increasing the percentage requirement for green electricity. 
8. This result carries over from the simpler model in Amundsen and Mortensen (2001). 
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In addition to this, the analysis shows that an increase in the carbon price will lead to a 
reduction of the generation of black electricity when interacting with TGC and TWC systems. How-
ever, it will also lead to a reduction of green electricity generation and of electricity savings, which 
may be seen as unwanted side effects of the carbon price increase. These results are due to the design 
of the TGC and TWC systems. In particular, from 6), we see that the end user price of electricity 
equivalents in equilibrium should be equal to a marginal cost composed as a linear combination of 
the marginal costs of generating the various types of electricity in the correct proportions. As the 
carbon price increases, it merely shifts the weighted marginal cost curve upwards and creates a 
higher end user price of electricity. This leads to less consumption of electricity equivalents and a 
unilaterally reduction of all types of electricity, as these are set in fixed proportions.
Other compatibility effects may be seen from Table 2, which summarizes various special 
cases. For instance, one may observe that an increase in the percentage requirement for electricity 
savings, β, will lead to less generation of both black electricity and green electricity if there is no 
TGC market (i.e., if α = 0). Furthermore, one may observe from Table 2 that there may be a stimulat-
ing effect from introducing a TGC market with small values of the percentage requirement. Hence, 
evaluated at α = 0, introduction of a TGC system will increase the generation of electricity and the 
generation of both green and white electricity, separately. However, it will not stimulate the sum of 
black and green electricity. Similarly, one may observe from Table 2 that there may be stimulating 
effects from introducing a TWC system with small values of the percentage requirement. Hence, 
evaluated at β = 0, a TWC system will increase the generation of electricity equivalents and white 
electricity, in particular. 
An important theoretical result of this analysis (see Table 2) is that the total demand for 
electricity equivalents may actually increase as a result of increased percentage requirements and 
lead to a lower wholesale price of electricity. This is important for tax incidence and for the question 
of who is really paying for the extra costs of increasing shares of green electricity and additional 
electricity savings9. This is not only a theoretical problem but also the case of a real world setting. To 
investigate further how certificates markets function when they are simultaneously active, we con-
9. A similar observation was made in Bye (2003) studying the relationship between the electricity market and a single 
green certificates market. A numerical model calibrated on 2003 data from the Norwegian electricity market showed that 
electricity consumption could actually increase as the percentage requirement increases. 
Table 1:  Effects of increasing values of α, β and 
τ: General case
 x xb xg xw xb + xg 
α ? < 0 ? ? ? 
β ? ? ? ? ? 
τ < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 
Table 2:  Effects of increasing values of α , β, and τ: Special cases for which signs 
can be determined
 x xb xg xw xb + xg 
α "0 0< =bif C  < 0  
"0 0< =bif C  
"0 0< =bif C  
α 0 0α> =at   0 0α> =at  0 0α> =at  0 0α< =at  
β  0 0β> =at  0 0α< =if  0 0α< =if   0 0β> =at  0 0α< =if  
τ 0<  0<  0<  0<  0<  
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struct a numerical model considering all three certificate markets and the new concept of electricity 
equivalents (i.e., including electricity savings). The model is calibrated on data for the Norwegian 
electricity market for the year 2016.
5. A CALIBRATED MODEL 
In formulating and calibrating the numerical model for the markets involved, it is con-
venient to consider the dual version of the analytical model presented earlier. Hence, demand and 
supply functions are formulated using a Cobb Douglas structure with relevant demand and supply 
elasticities (see Appendix B).
In short, we consider a demand function for electricity equivalents, f ( p), defined by 
( )=x f p , where ( (1 )) ( / (1 ))α β β β= + + + +e gc wcp p p p
In addition, we consider supply functions for the various electricity products; black elec-
tricity, h( pe), green electricity, g( pe + pgc), and white electricity, u( pe + pwc). As these are set to consti-
tute specific proportions of total electricity provision, we have
(1 )







f p h p x





+ e gc g
f p g p p x





+ e wc w
f p u p p x
The equilibrium of the model is, thus, given by x = xb + xg + xw.
We apply market data and elasticities for the Norwegian electricity market to calibrate the 
model (See Appendix B).
First, we investigate the effects on the various electricity components of increasing the 
percentage requirement for green electricity while keeping the percentage requirement for white 
electricity fixed at a given level, i.e., 0.2β = . Second, we investigate the effects on the various elec-
tricity components of increasing the percentage requirement for white electricity while keeping the 
percentage requirement for green electricity fixed at a given level, i.e., 0.2α = . Third, we investigate 
the effects on the various electricity components of increasing the percentage requirement for both 
green and white electricity simultaneously. Fourth, we investigate the effects of increasing the CO2 
tax, and fifth, we investigate the effects of increasing the CO2 tax when there are no markets for 
green and white certificates. 
As is seen from Figure 1, increasing the percentage requirement for green certificates while 
keeping β=0.2 will lead to reductions of the generation of both white and black electricity, while 
the generation of green electricity will increase.10 Furthermore, the consumption of total electricity 
10. Referring to Munoz, Sauma and Hobbs (2013) the marginal cost of increasing the percentage requirement α may well 
fall as the expansion of green generation capacity can induce lumpy transmission reinforcements. Likewise the functioning of 
Kirchhoff’s Voltage Law may also affect the marginal costs. Such effects are not taken account of in the model. However, this 
is probably not a problem for Norway. Looking at the capacity expansion of green electricity generation triggered by the existing 
TGC system that has taken place in Norway up until now, it turns out that a dominant part (85 to 90%) of the expansion of green 
generation capacity has manifested itself in the form of a large number of small scale water power plants that are rather scattered 
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equivalents will first increase, thereafter reach a maximum, and then decrease.11 This is also the case 
for the “non-virtual” electricity generated (sum of green and black electricity); at first it increases, 
thereafter reaches a maximum, and then decreases.
Likewise, as seen from Figure 2, an increase in the percentage requirement for white certif-
icates while keeping α=0.2 will lead to reductions of the generation of both green and black electric-
across the country (see NVE-Energimyndigheten, 2016, page 20). Hence, reinforcements of networks have not been sizable and 
lumpy and could best be described by the Continuous Transportation model discussed in Munoz, Sauma and Hobbs (2013) that 
will not cause problems of the above mentioned kind. Up until 2020 (the target year for the analysis) this development will prob-
ably continue. The potential expensive large scale offshore wind power farms that may give rise to lumpiness in transmission are 
not viable for years to come due to low expected future electricity prices within Nord Pool. 
11. For similar results see also Fischer (2009) and Felder (2011).  
Figure 1:  Generation and consumption of black, green and white electricity with increasing α 
while keeping β=0.2
Figure 2:  Generation and consumption of black, green and white electricity with increasing β 
while keeping α=0.2
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ity, while the generation of white electricity will increase. In addition, for this case, the consumption 
of total electricity equivalents (including white electricity) will first increase, thereafter reach a 
maximum and then decrease as the percentage requirement for white certificates increases. 
Figure 3 shows that a simultaneous expansion of the percentage requirements for both 
green and white certificates results in increases in both green and white electricity (curves covering 
each other) whereas black electricity and the sum of green and black electricity decreases. Further-
more, the consumption of total electricity equivalents will first increase, reach a maximum and then 
decreases.
As already noted and shown analytically in Appendix A, an increase in the CO2 tax leads to 
a unilateral reduction of all types of electricity generation and of the total consumption of electricity 
equivalents (See Figure 4). In particular, this means that both green and white electricity generation 
Figure 3:  Generation and consumption of black, green and white electricity with 
simultaneous increase of α and β
Figure 4:  Generation and consumption of black, green and white electricity with increasing 
carbon tax τ, including certificates markets with α=β=0.2
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are actually reduced as the CO2 tax increases. These effects may be seen as unwanted side effects of 
the green and white certificates markets.
Considering instead the case where there are no certificates markets, an increase in the 
CO2 tax would lead to not only a reduction in the generation of black electricity but also an in-
crease in green and white electricity. Thus, the unwanted effects from the above case are avoided, 
as is illustrated in Figure 5. The figure also illustrates that both the total consumption of electricity 
equivalents and the sum of black and green electricity generation decrease as the CO2 tax increases.
The results of this section thus far are summed up in Table 3. For the cases denoted (i), 
(ii), and (iii), total consumption of electricity equivalents, x, first increases, reaches a maximum at 
α = 0.128, β = 0.113 and α = β =0.141, respectively, and then decreases. For the case denoted (iv), the 
sum of green and black electricity shows a similar development for increasing values of α. The sum 
reaches a maximum at α = 0.129.
For all cases of increases of α and β considered, the end user price of electricity equivalents 
at first decreases, thereafter reaches a minimum and then increases. Corresponding to this, there are 
changes of the various types of surpluses; i.e., consumer’s surplus, producer’s surplus, tax revenue 
and total social surplus (the sum of the surpluses). For all cases considered, the social surplus de-
creases. However, it should be noted that the benefit of greenhouse gas reductions stemming from 
Figure 5:  Generation and consumption of black, green and white electricity with increasing 
carbon tax τ and no certificates markets
Table 3:  Effects of increasing values of α, β and τ: 
Numerical model
 x xb xg xw xb + xg 
α(β=0.2) ? (i) < 0 > 0 < 0 ? (iv) 
β(α=0.2) ? (ii) < 0 < 0 > 0 < 0 
α=β ? (iii) < 0 > 0 > 0 < 0 
τ(α=β=0.2) < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 
τ(α=β=0) < 0 < 0 > 0 > 0 < 0 
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the various policies has not been included, so one cannot draw the immediate conclusion that the 
adopted policies are welfare worsening.12
In addition to this, it may be interesting to note that the consumers’ surplus actually in-
creases for increasing values of α and β before it starts to decrease again. The loser in this setting is 
the producer of black electricity, in particular. Hence, producers’ surplus for the producers of black 
electricity is mostly transferred to consumers’ surplus. Additionally, the producer’s surpluses for 
green and white electricity may increase, as they are stimulated by increasing percentage require-
ments. For instance, the producer’s surplus of white electricity generation is increasing for increas-
ing values of β as α is kept constant, while the producers’ surplus for green electricity is decreasing 
(see Figure 6). A parallel result appears if α is increasing and β is kept constant. If both α and β are 
increasing, then both producer’s surpluses increase. 
6. DISCUSSION
To evaluate policy instruments such as the black, green and white certificate systems, it 
is important to understand how these specific instruments interact with each other and under what 
conditions multiple policy instruments are necessary (Fischer and Preonas, 2010). In addition, the 
assessment of such instruments must be related to the motivations and goals of adopting them. 
There are different levels of interpretation of what the goals of the adopted instruments 
really are. In the cases considered here, an immediate and direct way of interpreting the goals is 
simply to take the stated goals at their face values, i.e., that the goals are to achieve a reduction of 
the generation of black electricity and to attain specific percentage levels of renewables and energy 
savings. If this is the case, then the three systems work reasonably well. They do induce a reduction 
in black electricity, and they do attain the percentage targets. 
However, underlying the stated percentage targets, there must be some more comprehen-
sible goals from which they are derived. These could, for example, be a goal to increase the size of 
12. For Norway, however, we are very close to being able to draw such a conclusion. The reason is that the Norwegian 
electricity generation is based on almost 100% hydropower, and only small hydro power plants are considered green in the 
Norwegian-Swedish green certificates market. The remainder of the older large hydropower plants in Norway and Sweden 
do not qualify for green certificates and are, therefore, considered “black” in the terminology of the model. This stands in 
contrast to what would be the case in thermal-based power producing countries such as Denmark and Germany. 
Figure 6:  Change in welfare components due to harsher targets of energy savings/ efficiency
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the generation capacity of green electricity and to increase the amount of electricity savings (i.e., 
in quantitative terms rather than in percentage terms). The specific percentage targets chosen can 
then be seen as a step on the way to achieving these underlying quantitative goals as in the Norwe-
gian-Swedish TGC market. 13  Viewed in this way, the green and white certificate systems are no 
longer so advantageous. As has been shown in this article, it is generally not possible to tell whether 
introduction of a TGC and a TWC market on top of an electricity market will lead to more genera-
tion capacity of green electricity and electricity savings. Hence, if the long run target is to expand 
the capacity of green electricity generation and increase the amount of electricity savings to certain 
given levels, then these markets may not be the best to use. With such targets direct subsidies (i.e. 
feed-in tariffs) may be more efficient instruments to apply.
Things are, however, different for the black certificates system. This system does promote 
the goal of reducing the generation of black electricity in a cost effective way. It is a robust conclu-
sion in the paper that an increase of the black certificate price (carbon price) leads to a reduction of 
black electricity generation. Unfortunately, - when a TGC and a TWC system are active at the same 
time—the black certificate market also reduces the generation of green and white electricity (see 
Table 3). This would not have been the case if green and white electricity generation instead were 
stimulated by direct subsidies such as feed-in tariffs. 
However, beyond the goals to reduce the generation of black electricity, to increase the 
generation of green electricity and to increase electricity savings, there exist more profound moti-
vations and goals for the society that explain why society wants to regulate them. Looking at this 
from a purely economic point of view14 the regulation of market failures stand out as particularly 
important, and along with this, the choice of cost minimizing instruments when facing uncertainty. 
Hence, existence of several different and specific market failures involved in electricity generation 
may constitute reasons for announcing several separate goals and for applying several instruments. 
In addition to this the existence of uncertainty may itself be an economic argument for combining 
instruments even though there may be only one single market failure to address. 
However, it is not at all obvious which particular and specific market failure each of the 
percentage goals of green and white electricity is intended for.15 Things are, of course, different for 
the goal on emission reduction of greenhouse gases. Use of fossil energy constitutes an important 
market failure in terms of the negative externality of climate change. Nevertheless, one could see 
the three certificates systems as instruments for achieving the single goal of reducing the emissions 
of greenhouse gases (see e.g. Marcantonini and Ellerman, 2015). However, if this is the only and 
13. In the Norwegian-Swedish TGC market the intension is to jointly increase the capacity of green electricity by 28.4 
TWh by 2020. In order to achieve this it is necessary to adjust the percentage requirements along with adjustments following 
from revealed uncertainties. Hence, it is not the percentage as such that constitute the goal but rather the quantitative expan-
sion of capacity.  
14. As pointed out by Weitzman (1974) and other economists (e.g. Goulder and Parry, 2008; Fischer and Preonas, 
2010), there may be a host of other reasons than purely economic reasons that explain why a particular economic activity is 
regulated and why particular instruments are chosen. These are outside of the scope of this paper and we will not go into a 
discussion of these here.       
15. Generation and use of electricity may involve several other aspects of market failure that are not directly addressed 
by the instruments under consideration in this paper.  These include information and energy efficiency gaps (see e.g. Weitz-
man, 1974; Jaffe and Stavins, 1994; Fillipini et al., 2014), security of supply (see e.g. Joskow and Tirol, 2007; Joskow, 2008; 
Newbery, 2015; Newbery and Grubb, 2015), induced technological change and spill-over effects (see e.g. Popp, 2002; New-
ell, Jaffe and Stavins, 1999). Furthermore, there is a large body of theoretical and empirical literature considering instruments 
and governance measures to release spill-over effects on cost reduction from learning- by- doing for the attainment of energy 
and climate targets (see e.g. Jamasb, 2007; Neuhoff, 2008; Nordhaus, 2014; Bigerna, Bollino and Micheli, 2016; Newbery 
2017).  
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ultimate goal, one may ask why it is necessary to have several instruments and targets to achieve 
this goal. Clearly, as pointed out by several economists additional specific targets on the share of re-
newables and energy savings/ efficiency improvements may function as unnecessary and costly con-
straints (see, e.g., Böhringer and Rosendahl, 2010; Fischer and Preonas, 2010; Giraudet and Finon, 
2015).16 A simple observation is that a carbon tax or a black certificates market itself may generate 
the preferred effects, i.e., as shown in the article, an increase of the carbon price, when acting alone, 
will reduce the generation of black electricity, but at the same time, also increase the share of green 
electricity as well as increase the level of energy savings through price increases (see Figure 5). 
Against this, one may claim that combinations of instruments may be a good thing even 
with a single goal when various types of uncertainty are prevalent. Uncertainty related to the mar-
ginal abatement cost function and/ or the marginal social benefit function of abatement implies 
that the optimal ex post abatement is also uncertain. As shown by Weitzman (1974) the choice of 
whether to use a price mechanism or a quantity mechanism should be governed by which of these 
that gives the least expected loss in case of assessing the marginal abatement cost wrongly, when 
basing the ex ante decisions on expected values of cost and benefit functions. However, building 
on Weitzman’s seminal paper it has later been shown that the expected ex post loss from wrong 
assessment may be even smaller if quantity and price mechanisms are combined. Indeed, as shown 
by, e.g., Roberts and Spence (1976) and Kwerel (1977), it may be optimal from the point of view 
of society to combine a certificate system with an additional price instrument such as floor and ceil-
ing prices (a so-called “hybrid system”). More recently, Pizer (2003), Jacoby and Ellerman (2004), 
Burtraw and Palmer (2006), Goulder and Parry (2008) showed how a system of “safety valves” (ceil-
ing and floor prices) under uncertainty may increase the efficiency of a dynamic emissions certificate 
system that allows banking.17 Relating this to the cases considered in this article, it would seem logical 
to address uncertainty by adding such safety valves to the black certificate system rather than to add 
certificate systems of green and white electricity, if reduction in the emissions of greenhouse gases is 
the single ultimate goal while recognizing uncertainty. 
In conclusion, an evaluation of the efficiency of the three certificate systems must depend on 
the motivations and goals of adopting them. If the goals are accepted as they are without any consid-
eration of the economic efficiency of the goals, then all certificate systems work well. However, if the 
percentage goals are to attain certain quantitative targets of green and white electricity rather than to 
attain the given percentages (as is the case in the Norwegian Swedish TGC system), then feed-in tariffs 
may turn out be more direct and better alternatives to the TGC and the TWC systems. Furthermore, 
if the instruments are to be judged by the specific economic goals of addressing market failures, then 
neither the TGC nor the TWC system seem   efficient. Hence, only the black certificate system directly 
addresses a market failure i.e. the negative external effect of greenhouse gas emission.  Furthermore, 
the TGC and the TWC systems do not seem to add to the efficiency in achieving the greenhouse gas 
targets when recognizing the importance of uncertain abatement costs.  
16. On this specific point, Fischer and Preonas (2010) state: “… once emissions from electricity generation are suffi-
ciently priced or capped, additional renewable energy policies lead to little further emissions reductions or environmental 
benefit; in fact, they lower costs for the dirtier producers.” Along the same lines Giraudet and Finon (2015) write: “In all 
countries (i.e., France, Italy, and the UK), white certificate obligations coexist with the EU CO2 Emissions Trading System. The 
latter can be seen as a first-best solution to reduce CO2 emissions. Standard microeconomic reasoning predicts that the combina-
tion of two instruments will reduce CO2 emissions less cost-effectively than the stand alone first-best instrument (the EU ETS).”
17. The logic of this result is recently adopted in the Market Stability Reserve of EU ETS, becoming active as of January 
2019. According to this mechanism EU ETS quotas will enter into a reserve if quota prices tends to go below a floor price, while 
quotas from the reserve will be released if the quota price tends to rise above a given price cap.  
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7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper considers the compatibility of black, green and white certificate markets in-
tended to reduce the emission of CO2, increase the share of renewables and increase the share of 
energy saving, respectively. The markets function well together in the sense that a common equilib-
rium solution exists, where all targets are satisfied (e.g., share of green electricity and share of en-
ergy savings/ efficiency increase.) The equilibrium solution adapts to changing targets (e.g., harsher 
target on energy savings), but it is impossible to determine whether this will lead to more, less, or 
unchanged consumption of “black,” “green” or “white” electricity. 
Applying the model to real world data (i.e., a calibrated model based on parameter values 
determined from the Norwegian electricity market) helps much in determining the effects, but still 
ambiguous results appear. For instance, increasing the percentage requirement of green and/or white 
certificates from a zero level, leads at first to an increase in the total consumption of electricity 
equivalents, thereafter reaches a maximum and then decreases. Furthermore, increasing the percent-
age requirement of green electricity leads to an increase in green electricity but a reduction in white 
electricity, and vice versa when the percentage requirement of white electricity increases.       
Introduction of a green and/or a white certificate system also leads to sizable redistribu-
tions of consumers’ and producers’ surpluses. The calibrated model shows that an increase of the 
percentage requirement of green and/or white electricity from a zero level first yields an increase in 
the consumers’ surplus, before it starts to decrease. The increase in the percentage requirement of 
green electricity also increases the producers’ surplus of green electricity, whereas the producers’ 
surplus of white electricity decreases. Likewise, the increase in the percentage requirement of white 
electricity increases the producers’ surplus of white electricity, whereas the producers’ surplus of 
green electricity decreases. The loser is always the producer of black electricity who experiences a 
reduction in the producers’ surplus following from the introduction of the green and white certifi-
cates systems.  
Whether these markets may be seen as beneficial depends on the motivations for adopting 
them. The motivations may be many and range from the regulation of market failures to environ-
mental preservation, job creation and innovation with a consideration of distributional equity and 
political feasibility (Weitzman, 1974, Goulder and Parry, 1908; Fischer and Preonas, 2010). From 
an economic point of view it is more relevant to relate the three certificate systems to the existence 
of proper market failures such as climate change (a negative externality) and to uncertainty (Weitz-
man, 1974) Hence, the adoption of these systems can be seen as attempts to correct for market fail-
ures where the cost of this is levied on the producers of fossil energy and end users of energy. The 
discussion section of this paper indicates that the additional green and white certificate markets on 
top of the black certificates market are not particularly well suited for addressing the market failure 
aspects of electricity generation, nor are they beneficial in terms of combining to a hybrid system to 
address uncertainty. 
In addition to Norway, many countries have introduced or are considering introducing cer-
tificate systems within their energy sectors (See footnote 4). These systems are created somewhat 
differently worldwide, but they have, in common with the Norwegian case, a process where the 
certificates are tradable and the green and white energy targets are set in terms of percentage levels. 
These characteristics are essential for how the certificate systems work as they act in concert. Hence, 
the case of Norway is relevant for knowledge transfer, in particular with respect to how adjustments 
of the percentage requirements will work with respect to the indeterminacy problems noted. 
Furthermore, some of the countries have had second thoughts about how well suited these 
systems are, e.g., the UK is about to replace the green certificates (ROCs) by a feed-in tariff with 
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contracts for differences. Norway has also recently decided that it will stop allowing new projects 
to enter the green certificates system (while Sweden wants to continue and even increase the use of 
this system). For such decisions, the Norwegian experience may also be helpful. 
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APPENDIX A:  EFFECTS OF PARAMETER CHANGES
We consider effects of changes of α, β and τ on total generation of electricity equivalents, 
on black electricity generation, on green electricity generation, on white electricity generation (ad-
ditional electricity saving) and on electricity actually delivered to end users. 
Effects on total generation of electricity equivalents (x)
Observe from 1), 2) and 3) that ((1 ) (1 ))α β= − +bx x, ( (1 ))α β= +gx x and xw = 
(β/(1 + β))x. Substituting these expressions into 6) we have
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Total differentiations of 6) with respect to α, β and τ, give 
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Inspection of signs shows that both ( )αdx d  and ( )βdx d  are indeterminate when applying the 
general functional forms assumed in the model. However, ( )τdx d  is negative, i.e., an increase 
in the carbon price will definitely lead to a reduction in the total amount of electricity equivalents 
generated.
Effects on black electricity generation (xb)
Observe from 1), 2) and 3) that ((1 ) (1 ))β α= + − bx x , ( (1 ))α α= −g bx x , and xw = 
(β/(1 – α))x. Substituting into 6) and taking total differentials with respect to α, β and τ, we obtain
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Inspection of signs shows that ( )αbdx d  is negative, i.e., an increase in the percentage re-
quirement for green electricity will definitely lead to less black electricity generation.18 Furthermore, 
( )βbdx d  is indeterminate, while ( )τbdx d  is negative. 
Effects on green electricity generation (xg)
Observe from 1), 2) and 3) that ((1 ) )β α= + gx x , ((1 ) )α α= −b gx x , and ( )β α=w gx x . 
Substituting into 6) and taking total differentials with respect to α, β and τ, we obtain
2 " 2 "
2 2(1 ) ' (1 )(1 )







































Inspection of signs shows that ( )αgdx d  
and ( )βgdx d  
are indeterminate, while ( )τgdx d  
is nega-
tive. 
Effects on white electricity generation (electricity saving) (xw)
Observe that ((1 ) )β β= + wx x , ((1 ) )α β= −b wx x , ( )α β=g wx x . Substituting into 6) and 
taking total differentials with respect to α, β and τ obtain 
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Inspection of signs shows that ( )αwdx d  and ( )βwdx d  are indeterminate, while ( )τwdx d  is nega-
tive. 
18. This result is a generalization of a result reported earlier in Amundsen and Mortensen (2001, 2002).
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Effects on electricity generation (xb + xg)
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Inspection of signs shows that ( ( ) )α+b gd x x d  
and ( ( ) )β+b gd x x d  
are indeterminate, while 
( ( ) )τ+b gd x x d  
is negative. 
APPENDIX B: A CALIBRATED MODEL
The demand function f is specified as a Cobb-Douglas function: 
( )ε= =D Dx A p f p ,
where AD is the calibration factor, ε is the elasticity of demand and p = pe + (α/(1 + β))pgc + 
(β/(1 + β))pwc. The supply function h for black electricity is assumed given by 
( ) ( )κ= =bS bb e ex A p h p
where Ab is the calibration factor and κb is the supply elasticity. The supply function g for green 
electricity is assumed given by 
( ) ( )κ ξ= + − = +gS gg e gc g e gcx A p p g p p
where Ag is the calibration factor, κ g is the supply elasticity and ξg represents the intercept for this 
kind of electricity. The supply function u for electricity saving is assumed given by 
( ) ( )κ ξ= + − = +wS ww e wc w e wcx A p p u p p
where Aw is the calibration factor, κw is the supply elasticity and ξw is the intercept for this kind of 
electricity.
Hence, total supply of electricity equivalents is given by  
= + +S S S Sb g wx x x x
and market equilibrium requires =D Sx x , or alternatively expressed f ( p) = h( pe) + g( pe + pgc) + 
u( pe + pwc).
Furthermore, equilibrium in the wholesale market, the green certificates market and the 
white certificates market, respectively, requires 
(1 )







f p h p
124 / The Energy Journal
All rights reserved. Copyright © 2018 by the IAEE.






f p g p p






f p u p p
The parameters and calibrated values of demand and supply are applied in the analysis. The quanti-
ties are in TWh, and the prices are in 0.01 NOK per kWh.





















































, 0,25,0( ) 31.5(20) 66.6
κξ = = =ggg gA p , 
0,2
,0( ) 46.4(20) 84.4
κξ = = =www wA p  
Calibration is based on prices and quantities in the base year (denoted by 0) and in expected val-
ues 10 years ahead (denoted by 10). For the case of 0.2, 0.1α β= = , marginal costs in equilibrium 
are given by ' 21.4=bC , 
' 86.1=gC  
and ' 68.0=wC , with corresponding certificate prices given by
64.7=gcp  and 46.6=wcp .  
APPENDIX C: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
To check the robustness of the model we investigate the sensitivities of the supply elas-
ticities. In part, the supply elasticities reflect the assumptions on the functional forms of marginal 
generation costs of green, white and black electricity i.e. a higher supply elasticity increases the 
curvature and the steepness of the marginal cost functions. Table C. 1. shows the elasticities used in 
the sensitivity analysis.   
It turns out that the results obtained are very robust when changing the supply elasticities 
used. This can be seen from Table C.2. that shows the percentage deviances of electricity generated 
compared to the Base Case when α = β = 0,2. 
The high degree of robustness can also be seen from Figure C.1. and Figure C. 2. These 
show the development of quantities as α and β are expanded simultaneously (α = β). Hence, com-
paring with the Base Case for α = β in Figure 3, we see that the profiles of the graphs are the same 
even though quantities are slightly changed. Furthermore, it also turns out that the same degree of 
robustness is present for the other cases discussed (partial change of α keeping β and τ constant, 
partial change of β keeping α and τ constant, and partial change of τ keeping α and β constant). The 
same goes for changes of the demand elasticity. For the sake of brevity these results are not shown, 
but they can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
Table C. 1: Supply elasticities
  High values,   
Supply elasticity Base case Green and White High value, Black 
Green el. (κ g) 0,25 0,7 0,25 
White el. (κw) 0,2 0,7 0,2 
Black el. (κb) 0,3 0,3 0,7 
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Table C. 2:  Percentage quantitative deviances from base case when 
α = β = 0,2
Quantity of Base case High values of Green High value of 
Electricity  elasticity and White elasticities Black elasticity 
Green ( Sgx ) 100 99,9 97,7 
White ( Swx ) 100 99,9 97,7 
Black ( Sbx ) 100 102,5 97,7 
Total ( Sx ) 100 101,3 98,1 
Figure C. 1:  Generation and consumption of black, green and white electricity with 
simultaneous increase of α and β, high supply elasticities of green and white 
electricity 
Figure C. 2:  Generation and consumption of black, green and white electricity with 
simultaneous increase of α and β, high supply elasticity of black electricity 

